Using the ‘Fog of War’ as an Excuse is Unacceptable

Early in my military career, I spent a year at Fort Leavenworth studying operational art, military history, doctrine, and theory. During that time, I became deeply interested in Carl von Clausewitz and his seminal work, On War. His analyses of Napoleons campaigns offered insights that remain relevant to modern conflictswhether conventional battles, counterterrorism operations, intelligence-driven missions, or even efforts against organized crime. One professor summarized it succinctly: If you want fresh ideas, read the old masters.

Recently, when Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth defended the September 2 missile strike on a small vessel near Venezuela by claiming he couldnt see two wounded men due to the fog of war, it drew attention for a critical reason. Clausewitzs concept of fog was misapplied. The secretarys statement seemed aimed at using authoritative language while leaving both the public and the press uncertain about the facts. Leaders sometimes employ vague phrasing for legitimate reasons, but the concern arises when unclear language masks incomplete understanding or shields decision-makers from accountability.

A careful review of the September 2 strike is needed to determine whether Hegseths lack of clarity was justified. This is not the first instance of his imprecise statements. During his confirmation hearing, he struggled to address a technical question about opening part of the militarys electromagnetic spectrum to civilian use, offering a convoluted response rather than a clear, informed answer.

In discussing the missile strike, Hegseth emphasized the delegation of decision-making and the strategic layers of authority. He described observing the first missile hit but not the second, which may have constituted a potential war crime, citing smoke and fire as reasons for not seeing survivors and labeling it the fog of war.

Clausewitz, often mistakenly credited with coining fog of war, described it as the uncertainty inherent in conflictuncertain intelligence, conflicting reports, fear, haste, miscommunication, and the tendency to mistake assumptions for facts. It is a metaphor for human limitations, not literal smoke or explosions. Misusing the term as a physical excuse misrepresents the critical challenge: what leaders perceive, what information they rely on, and whether they exercise disciplined judgment before ordering further action.

Clausewitz warned that commanders often receive uncertain or incorrect information. Effective leaders mitigate risk by questioning assumptions, slowing decisions, and resisting impulses to act on incomplete evidence. In practice, failure arises not from unavoidable fog, but from poor judgment and insufficient adherence to process and law.

If operators identified survivors who were then ignored or overridden, the fault lies in leadership, not fog. Modern militaries are structured to prevent rash, emotionally driven decisions. Misidentifying errors as unavoidable uncertainty risks unfairly blaming those who carried out orders under structured command.

By invoking fog as an excuse, senior leaders may shield themselves while endangering the accountability of military personnel. Hegseth, as the highest-ranking official present, bore responsibility for the initial strike. Inaccurate framing of events risks creating a narrative that deflects responsibility from civilian leadership to service members.

Clausewitz also emphasized frictionthe unpredictable obstacles that accumulate in warfarebut noted that competent leaders reduce its effects through training, preparation, clear command, and sound procedures. Uncertainty cannot be eliminated, but cascading mistakes can be prevented. The September 2 strike suggests avoidable failures rather than unavoidable chaos, and the secretarys explanation does little to alleviate this concern.

This incident requires a transparent, thorough investigation. Accountability matters not only politically, but professionally, to maintain public trust and uphold military standards. Clausewitz argued that commanders must exercise sensitive and discriminating judgment to uncover truth amid uncertaintya principle that applies equally to all leaders responsible for this strike.

Until this inquiry provides answers, the real fog is not the natural uncertainty of war, but the confusion created by incomplete explanations, premature defenses, and blurred lines between genuine uncertainty and potentially unlawful action. In a democracy, clarifying that fog is not optionalit is the duty of those in command to ensure clarity, responsibility, and moral leadership.

Analysis: Leadership, Fog, and Accountability

The September 2 missile strike near Venezuela raises a fundamental question about leadership and the use of language in military operations. Secretary Hegseth’s invocation of “fog of war” to explain his limited observation of events misrepresents the concept originally outlined by Clausewitz. The uncertainty Clausewitz described is inherent in conflict, but it is not a catch-all excuse for incomplete situational awareness or leadership shortcomings.

Careful scrutiny of this strike is necessary. Modern militaries rely on structured command, verified intelligence, and disciplined decision-making to minimize errors. When survivors were potentially ignored or information was unclear, responsibility rested with senior leadership—not with inevitable uncertainty. The misapplication of “fog” risks shielding decision-makers and unfairly attributing blame to operational personnel.

Clausewitz’s emphasis on friction and the necessity of sensitive, discriminating judgment highlights the gap between theory and practice in this case. Leaders must question assumptions, verify information, and act according to law and procedure. The September 2 incident suggests avoidable failures rather than unavoidable chaos, and public trust requires a transparent investigation to clarify responsibility.

Until that inquiry concludes, the real “fog” is the confusion created by incomplete explanations and defensive framing. True accountability demands that leaders provide clarity and maintain moral and professional standards, ensuring that uncertainty does not become a cover for error or misconduct.

Sources:

• The ‘Fog of War’ Is No Excuse