Comptroller warns Israel is not ready for potential terror attack on central light rail

The State Comptrollers Office released a report highlighting significant security vulnerabilities in the Dan-region light rail, stating that major transportation projects are not legally required to meet police technical and operational security standards during planning, initiation, or tender processes. Matanyahu Englman, State Comptroller, emphasized the urgency of the findings, noting that they directly impact public safety.

Englman remarked that since October 7, the need to address these gaps has intensified, citing "serious shortcomings across multiple areas." Between August 2024 and January 2025, the Comptrollers Office conducted an extensive evaluation of Israels readiness for a terror attack on the Red Line, the countrys busiest transit corridor. The audit reviewed the roles and procedures of institutions including the Israel Police, NTA Metropolitan Mass Transit, the Defense Ministry, National Emergency Management Authority (NEMA), National Security Council (NSC), Transportation Ministry, Fire and Rescue Authority, Magen David Adom (MDA), Privacy Protection Authority, and the National Security Ministry.

Field inspections were conducted along the light rail route, supplemented by consultations with the Shin Bet. Cyberterrorism scenarios were not included in this review.

Key Audit Findings

A primary concern identified is the absence of a legally designated authority to approve casualty scenarios for terrorist attacks on the light rail. NEMA had formulated a scenario based on operational research, expecting Transportation Ministry approval, while the NSC argued that the ministry should oversee all national transport security planning. Despite rejecting NEMAs scenario in 2019 as overestimating casualties, the ministry had not provided an alternative by January 2025.

The audit noted that even though the police are the authorized security authority, their standards are not mandatory for major transportation projects, and they have not finalized binding underground-rail security norms begun in early 2023. Chemical attack preparedness also lacks regulated consultation during planning stages, leaving no binding requirement to follow recommendations from the designated chemical response unit.

Staff shortages in NTAs security guard corps were highlighted as a critical weakness. The number of guards declined steadily, with several shifts below required staffing and some falling under minimum thresholds. Training, including hand-to-hand combat refreshers, has decreased. With future expansions of the light rail and a planned metro system, this gap is expected to worsen.

Mass transit security also faces technological challenges. Communication failures persist underground, as MDA radios cannot interface with police or fire systems, leaving teams unable to coordinate in incidents if cellular networks fail. The Comptroller reiterated calls for a national underground training facility to simulate subterranean conditions and train all emergency and light rail personnela need first raised in 2016, yet still unaddressed by January 2025.

Positive Observations

The audit recognized strong collaboration between the police and NTA, especially in joint training and routine security operations. The Comptrollers team visited NTAs Moshav Tal Shahar training center, praising its modern infrastructure and scenario-based training facilities. However, the center serves only NTA guards and is not a national underground facility.

Recommendations

Englman concluded that the Transportation Ministry must assemble all relevant bodies to review casualty scenarios, verify underlying research, and seek clarifications. Additionally, the police, National Security Ministry, Transportation Ministry, and Finance Ministry are tasked with analyzing and addressing the national security guard shortage, described as "a national challenge requiring urgent action."

Author: Sophia Brooks