This is how a successful Reform-Tory alliance will appear

Recent reports suggested that Nigel Farage informed Reform donors that a pre-election pact with the Conservative Party was probable. However, he publicly denied these claims in strong terms. On X, he criticized the Tories for years of dishonesty, asserting that they should never be forgiven and insisting a deal would not take place. Robert Jenrick, widely regarded as a potential future Conservative leader, also rejected the idea outright.

Despite these denials, the original reports appear to reflect reality: a pre-election arrangement between Reform and the Tories is likely inevitable. The real questions are about the timing and nature of such cooperation. Publicly acknowledging negotiations would imply a lack of confidence in their own parties, potentially harming both in the polls. Therefore, strong denials were politically necessary.

The reality is that a general election before 2029 seems increasingly likely. Opinion polls for months have indicated that a Reform-Tory coalition is the most probable outcome. Anticipating this, both parties would be unwise not to explore preliminary discussions to ensure a Right-leaning alliance comes to power.

Should Reform lead in the polls at the onset of a campaign, left-wing activists are expected to organize significant tactical voting to prevent Farage from entering Number 10. This could weaken Reform without necessarily improving Tory results. Consequently, informal cooperation between the two parties would make strategic sense.

Direct high-level meetings, such as a Farage-Badenoch summit, are implausible due to the risk of leaks. Instead, informal communication between donors, backbenchers, and party peers could take place. Similarly, any eventual deal need not be formal or publicly announced. Explicit pre-election agreements would suggest a lack of confidence and could damage voter support.

There are multiple ways such informal cooperation could work. At a basic level, each party could agree not to invest heavily in constituencies where the other has little chance of winning and where a left-wing candidate could prevail. Reform may struggle in affluent Southern seats, while the Tories may be uncompetitive in certain working-class areas. Quietly stepping aside in these cases would be logical.

At a more structured level, both parties could field weaker candidates or limit campaign efforts against the others strong candidates. The highest level of unofficial coordination might include an agreement to avoid aggressive negative campaigning against each other. Similar arrangements are common in internal party leadership contests and could serve as a blueprint for broader cooperation.

Given Farages strong antipathy toward the Tories, even these informal measures may be challenging. However, an alternative approach could appeal to him: Farage could unilaterally designate a select list of Tory candidates Reform would not challenge in the election. This would allow him to work with like-minded Conservatives in a coalition while shaping the party in a more Right-leaning direction. Essentially, he could influence the Conservative Party externally, molding it to resemble Reforms platform.

The potential next step is clear: gradually absorbing the Conservative Party within a coalition government framework. While some Tory members might resist, many could accept a pragmatic arrangement, valuing the presence of a Right-leaning government above all.

In short, a pre-election deal between Reform and the Tories is almost inevitable, though it will be informal, strategic, and carefully managed to avoid public backlash.

Author: Noah Whitman