Congress is the Supreme Court's preferred target for criticism, and it's about to face the consequences

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Congress is the Supreme Court's preferred target for criticism, and it's about to face the consequences

The Supreme Court is set to hear Trump v. Slaughter on Monday, December 8, in a case that could reshape the balance of power among the branches of government. The dispute centers on whether President Donald Trump has the authority to remove Rebecca Slaughter, one of the commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), without cause. Legal analysts say the outcome appears all but certain.

This case reflects a long-running effort by a faction of conservative lawyers and judges, influential since the 1980s, to expand presidential power. Now, these jurists dominate the Court. Their broader agenda seeks to redefine the separation of powers, giving the president broad control over federal agencies, shielding the president from many legal challenges, and granting the judiciary the ability to veto executive branch actions.

In Trump v. Slaughter, the Court is likely to reinforce presidential authority over federal agencies. This could significantly diminish Congresss ability to establish independent agencies capable of acting without White House approval. Trumps arguments echo the reasoning in Trump v. United States (2024), where the Court allowed the president to engage in certain acts without criminal liability.

Previously, the Courts Republican majority has supported legal doctrines that increase judicial oversight of executive actions. One example is the major questions doctrine, which allows the Court to nullify executive policies if the justices deem them excessively influential or far-reaching. Together, these trends reflect a sweeping reinterpretation of constitutional powers.

The key issue in Slaughter is whether Trump can remove her from the FTC. By law, commissioners can only be removed for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance. Trump argues that Slaughters positions clash with his administrations priorities, rather than alleging misconduct. A temporary ruling last September indicated that Trump could proceed with her removal, suggesting the final decision will likely confirm this outcome.

Underlying the case is the unitary executive theory, which argues that the Constitution vests all executive authority exclusively in the president. This theory, originating from Justice Antonin Scalias 1988 dissent in Morrison v. Olson, now guides the thinking of all six Republican justices. According to this view, the president must have complete control over executive officials, including the power to dismiss them at will.

Critics note that the theory is vague, particularly regarding which powers count as executive. Historically, federal prosecutions were often managed outside the executive branch, and independent agencies with leaders protected from presidential removal have existed since the earliest days of the Republic. For instance, in 1790, Alexander Hamilton proposed a commission overseeing national debt that included the chief justice and vice president, neither of whom the president could remove.

The Courts conservative majority relies heavily on this theory, along with broad interpretations of executive power, to justify Trumps authority. The same legal reasoning underpinned the controversial decision shielding Trump from certain prosecutions, a logic that now extends to firing Slaughter.

In addition to the unitary executive, the Court has embraced the major questions doctrine, asserting that Congress must clearly authorize any delegation of substantial policy decisions to executive officials. While framed as protecting legislative authority, the doctrine effectively allows the Court to veto policies enacted by both Congress and the president.

The combination of these doctrines shifts power decisively away from Congress. Independent agencies may lose protections that have existed for nearly a century, and Congresss ability to hold the president accountable through legislation is weakened. Meanwhile, the judiciary gains unprecedented authority to oversee and block both legislative and executive actions.

Historical precedents, such as Humphreys Executor v. United States (1935), which upheld congressional protections for independent agencies, and early commissions from the Washington administration, stand in contrast to the Courts emerging vision. Nonetheless, the Republican justices appear committed to these transformations, making substantial changes to the separation of powers likely to persist beyond Trumps presidency.

In short, Trump v. Slaughter is expected to cement presidential control over federal agencies, further limit Congresss power, and reinforce doctrines that expand both executive and judicial authority. Legal observers suggest that the Court is performing a procedural formality rather than reconsidering the broader implications, indicating the outcome is all but guaranteed.

Author: Sophia Brooks

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