Opinion - Navy Must Change Design Methods to Speed Up Shipbuilding

Just before Thanksgiving, Navy Secretary John Phelan announced the termination of the $22 billion Constellation program, which had aimed to deliver 20 multi-mission frigates. These ships were intended to handle anti-air, anti-surface, anti-submarine, and electromagnetic operations in both coastal and open-sea environments. So far, the Navy had spent roughly $2 billion of the $7.6 billion allocated by Congress for the first six ships.

Phelan confirmed that construction on the first two vessels would continue, but the remaining four planned ships would be canceled. He explained the decision as necessary to expand the fleet more rapidly in response to emerging threats.

The first Constellation frigate had originally been scheduled for delivery next year, but current projections push that to 2029, assuming no further setbacks. The delays primarily stemmed from design complications. While the Navy initially claimed the ships basic and functional designs were 88% complete, the reality was that much of the design work remained unfinished.

The Constellation was supposed to be an adaptation of the Italian-French FREMM frigate, with the Navy planning to retain about 85% of the original design. However, extensive modifications reduced the similarity to just 15%. Confusion over the designs completion persisted, with reports indicating the detailed design was over 80% complete in 2022, yet two years later it was reportedly under 80% complete. This indicates that approved design elements were being revisited while construction was already underway.

The Government Accountability Office criticized the Navy for allowing construction to begin before finalizing the design, noting that this approach contradicts established best practices in shipbuilding. Unsurprisingly, these design revisions caused both schedule delays and cost increases, ultimately rendering the program unfeasible.

The Constellations challenges are part of a recurring pattern. In the late 1990s, the Navy started the DD-21 destroyer program, later renamed the Zumwalt class (DDG-1000). Originally planned for 32 ships, only three were ever funded, with design missteps and shifting mission requirements driving costs up to $22 billion.

Similarly, the Littoral Combat Ship program faced major setbacks. Initially conceived as a 2,000-ton multi-mission corvette, the design evolved into two variants exceeding 3,100 tons. These changes caused technical failures, delays, inflated costs, and early retirements of vessels from service.

Phelan emphasized the need to deliver ships faster to meet current threat environments rather than bureaucratic convenience. To meet this goal, the Navy must overhaul its ship design process, ensuring that designs are genuinely near completion before construction begins. Without this change, cost overruns and delays will persist, even as rival fleets, particularly Chinas, continue to expand and modernize.

Author: Gavin Porter